The International Criminal Court (ICC) should act wisely regarding Kenyatta and Ruto

 

Kenya’s recent general election was remarkably peaceful when comparing to the previous one – resulted in the death of around 1200 Kenyans. Isolated inter-communal clashes were indeed reported, but nothing comparable to 2007. In sum, this shows that consent can be achieved if social order is promoted by the political establishment, if it is fomented by the civil society and if it is willingly assimilated by the populace.

The aftermath of the 2007 elections led the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate the causes of the violence that occurred. According to its findings, both Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto – recently elected President and Deputy president, respectively – were found guilty for playing a leading role in mobilizing and inciting the youths into violence. Before, during and after the elections, the ICC has been summoning both Kenyatta and Ruto to face trial, which they have repeatedely denied. The ICC has indeed humanely realized that such crimes should not go unpunished.

However, what the ICC does not realize is that the same accused political leaders did also play a major role in guaranteeing that the situation would not unravel into 2007 levels. What the ICC does not realize is that – in its own ideal vision – in the speculative case of Kenyatta and Ruto being prosecuted and arrested, the country will certainly fall into chaos. And if that happens, the ICC will be openly destabilizing the African Continent and promoting an attractive environment for an element which is expanding across the Horn of Africa – religious militancy. This is something which does not serve the interests of sub-Saharan Africa nor the World in general.

It is not only Africa and the World who can prove to be a major obstacle for the ICC. Kenyans themselves would not accept seeing their (fairly) elected leader being arrested by a foreign actor. In the same way, Kenyans themselves would not accept seeing the son of the person who is considered Kenya’s founding father being taken removed from power.

The ICC does not seem to understand the social and political dynamics that constitute the stability of one of the most developed (in both social and economic terms) countries in the African continent, and its implications for the regional geopolitics (Horn of Africa). There is a lesson which the ICC should learn, being it that sometimes one is given only two options to choose from: the bad and the even worst option. Which will one choose? Well, it is a matter of thinking wisely.

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Cabinda’s independence fighters declare an end in hostilities. However, certain conditions must be observed.

 The Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda – Frente para a Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda, FLEC – has publicly declared its intention to cease its activities in return for autonomy. After more than thirty-five years of armed struggle, there is hope that the volatile region might stabilize.

The April 25, 1974, “Carnation Revolution” in Portugal, which resulted in the overthrow of the long-lasting authoritarian regime, had as its major impact the end of the colonial war and, consequentially, of the Portuguese colonial enterprise. In fact, every single colonial territory was granted independence.

Angola became a major Cold-War stage, where the two major factions – MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola, or People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola) was supported by the Soviet Bloc (Cuba, under Fidel Castro, had troops on the ground), and UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola, or National Union for the Total independence of Angola, supported by the Western Bloc), fought each other between 1975 and 2002, having some interludes.

IN 1975 the MPLA army invaded the Cabinda enclave which, by then had formed a provisional government. The MPLA, supported by Cuban soldiers, overpowered the Cabinda-based movements and took control of the major cities, finally establishing full control after two months of fighting.

Since then, the FLEC – which was not always united under the same banner – has clashed with Angolan Armed Forces. Despite a cease-fire in 2006, conflict continued unabated.

The FLEC has now announced its intention to push for a definitive peace settlement. Antoine Kitembo, FLEC’s Vice-President has stated in a written document that it is “time to make concessions to yesterday’s enemies”. The document continues by saying that it is necessary to open a new page in which Cabinda’s identity and shared sovereignty with Angola, with the ultimate end of total sovereignty over local affairs.

Realizing that it will not be easy for Angola’s government to accept such conditions in a quick way, FLEC also proposes a debate to be started over Cabinda’s administrative status. The option are: Associate Sovereign State, Autonomous Territory, or Federal Autonomous State.

In what seems a move to grant legitimacy and a sense of ‘moral obligation’ to a possible acceptance of any of the options, FLEC demands that during the negotiations there should be present representatives not only part of the organization and the Angolan Government, but also representatives from Portugal (as both region’s former colonial power), Catholic Church, Cabinda’s traditional authorities, African Union, civil society, European Parliament and the enclave’s regional neighbours – The Congos.

Though it seems far-fetched that the Government of Angola will accept any of these terms, the fact that this news is being highly publicized in Angolan press – argued to be tightly censured and controlled -, there might be signs that José Eduardo dos Santos’ regime is somewhat willing to negotiate some, if not satisfying enough, terms.

After all, Cabinda is not just a piece of land detached from Angolan territory. It is a highly oil-rich area which cannot be easily given away, nor unconditionally given a ‘loose leash’.

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Christians being targeted in Sudan.

Is Bashir’s regime re-taking the path to establish a pure Islamic State? Well, first of all it would certainly strenghten his position among the powerful religious core of the regime and social elites. Second, It would also please some factions among the external opposition. And as, or even more important, it would serve as a ‘show of good-will’ towards Iran – who is now highly considered to be Sudan’s most important and fundamental ally.

The Battle for Somalia

Source: Somali Real

Historical Background

Somalia is historically made up of a complex system of clans and sub-clans, to whom deeply entrenched loyalties are given, to the extent that people are traditionally identified not from where they come but to which clan they belong to. According to Martin Meredith, in his book The Scramble for Africa (p.466), “Somali politics tended to consist more of shifting allegiances and temporary coalitions of lineages, making the system inherently unstable.” What Meredith says is extremely important if one wants to understand the political developments in Somalia in the last two decades.

Somalia has recently elected its first effective government for twenty years, since Mohammed Siad’s dictatorial regime was overthrown by the United Somali Congress (USC), a Hawiye-clan dominated group – the Hawiye is the dominant clan in Central Somalia, and as a result in Mogadishu region. Right after overthrowing the regime, the USC imploded and disintegrated following a power struggle between two Hawiye leaders – each belonging to two distinct sub-clans. Several clashes took place between the two forces for the conquest of Mogadishu, resulting in famine, starvation and death. A power-vaccum soon followed.

This anarchical state was thus scrambled by competing warlords and inter-clan conflict. There was no stability nor single control over the territory, causing “soaring poverty rates, destruction of infra-structure, ethnic cleansing, near-continual armed conflict, the emergence of several semi-autonomous regions, and a series of severe famines.” (Rob Wise, p. 2)

In late 2004 a Transitional Federal Government (TFG) comprised of representatives from Somalia’s largest clans, was created, having the support of its Western neighbour, Ethiopia. On February 2006 it moved into the south-central town of Baidoa. However, the TFG was unable to overcome clan politics or exert any level of authority outside Baidoa’s region. In sum, the war and tragic situation continued unabated and worsening.

In order to tackle the rampant lawlessness, the late 1990′s brought about the creation of Sharia courts. Those courts based on the Islamic Law intended to restore a degree of law and order, being largely welcomed, for they provided people with much needed security and stability (Rob Wise, p. 3). Moreover, in 2004 eleven of the courts merged to form the Islamic Courts Union and, by June 2006, managed to crush the warlords, seized power in Mogadishu, and began expanding into the countryside. Some members also used this success to impose their own vision of strict Islamic law.

In the 1980’s a group of middle-eastern educated Somali Wahabis created a group called Al Itihaad al Islamiya (AIAI), which had as its main goal the establishment of an Islamic State in all of Somalia (David Childs, 2005). By 2000, the group disintegrated maintaining only its youngest militant members. Later the group was reformed, giving birth to al-Shabaab and was later incorporated into the ICU, representing the Court’s youth movement.

The growth of al-Shabaab

In early 2006, al-Shabaab fighters attacked Mogadishu as part of a campaign by the ICU to gain control of the capital from the warlords. Meanwhile, the ICU advances in Mogadishu and south-central Somalia were observed with great concern by Somalia’s long historical foe, Ethiopia. As a result, on December 24^th 2006, the Ethiopian army entered Somalia, rapidly destroyingly the ICU and taking control of Mogadishu (Martin Plaut, 2007).

ICU leaders immediately fled the country. On the other side, members of al-Shabaab retreated to the south of the country, from where they started a guerrilla campaign against the Ethiopian military in Somalia. In addition, al-Shabaab began operating independently from the ICU, and as a result the group established as their main goals to expel the Ethiopian army from the country and create an Islamic state. Al-Shabaab began gathering wide support among the south-central population, ultimately holding control over a significant part of the country. Nationalist feelings among the population towards the ‘foreign invaders’ made recruitment easier. As a matter of fact, the aftermath of the invasion showed an exponential increase in al-Shabaab’s militancy from 400 to an estimate of 4,000 (Kathryn H. Floyd, 2010), transforming al-Shabaab into the single most powerful and radical resistance force in the country.

On February 26th, 2008, the U.S. Department of State declared al-Shabaab as a ‘foreign terrorist organization’. Al-Shabaab answered in April 5^th of the same year, by saying that (NEFA Foundation, 2008):

“This American behaviour shows the close allegiance between the crusaders everywhere – and that they will spare no effort to extinguish the fire of Allah (…) We fight the Ethiopian crusaders on the territory of Somalia (…) In conclusion, we say to the patron and protector of the cross, America: the wager that you made on the Ethiopians, Ugandans and Burundians in Somalia was a failure (…) Allah willing, we will attack them, roam [through their ranks], cut off every path they will take, chase away those who follow them, and fight them as insects and wolves.”

Christopher Harnisch (p.28) clearly says that al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab have, above all, one major common goal: “the expulsion of perceived infidels—namely the American Crusaders and their partners—from Muslim lands, and the establishment of a global Islamic state.”

In the first months of 2010, al-Shabaab announced its intention “to connect the Horn of Africa jihad to the one led by al Qaeda and its leader Sheikh Osama Bin Laden” and vowed allegiance to al-Qaeda: “We await your instructions and we will act according to what you see in the coming stage to be in the interests of jihad and the Muslim Ummah” (Bill Roggio, 2011).

Although links were established between the two groups in the previous years, it was only on February 9^th 2012, that Al-Shabaab’s intention to join Al-Qaeda was formally accepted by the most famous terrorist group in the planet (Agence France-Presse, 2012).

On October 28, 2008, al-Shabaab executed a series of five synchronized suicide attacks across Somalia killing 31 people (Xan Rice, 2008). This event marked a change in the group’s tactics, making it highly likely that these attacks were executed with al-Qaeda tactical advice (Bruton, 2010).

Foreign intervention

In March 2009, the Ethiopian army withdrew and was replaced by an African union peacekeeping force, named African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) which is comprised mostly of Ugandan and Burundian peacekeepers. AMISOM was largely placed and concentrated in Mogadishu, aiming at supporting the TFG.

The African Union Mission in Somalia is mandated by the U.N. Security Council to “stabilize the situation in the country in order to create conditions for the conduct of Humanitarian activities and an immediate take over by the United Nations (UN)” (AMISOM, 2012). The mandate, extended on December 22, 2010, “requests the African Union to urgently increase its force strength to its mandated level of 12,000 uniformed personnel, thereby enhancing its ability to carry out its mandate”. It also “requests AMISOM to continue to assist the Transitional Federal Government in the development of the Somali Police Force and the National Security Force” and “stresses the need to continue to develop an effective Somali police force and welcomes the desire of the African Union to develop a police component within AMISOM.”

However, it is not only the U.N./African Union mandated AMISOM who is currently taking military action in the field. In November 2011, one thousand Ethiopian troops invaded central Somalia in coordination with Kenya, who attacked from the south. Rob Wise (p. 3) explains the reasons for Ethiopia’s intervention:

•  “Majority-Christian Ethiopia grew alarmed about the potential for religiously motivated, ICU-sponsored violence within borders;

• Radical voices within the ICU increasingly began to refer ‘jihad’ against the Ethiopian ‘crusaders’;

• ICU forces began encircling and preparing to attack Baidoa, the seat of the Ethiopian-backed Transitional Federal Government.”

On February 22^nd, 2012, the Ethiopian army took the city of Baidoa, al-Shabaab’s second most important stronghold (Pan-African News, 2009). Some months before, in the night of 6 to 7 of august 2011, al-Shabaab’s pulled out from Mogadishu after an offensive by AMISOM troops. Al-Shabaab was seemingly loosing power, influence and leverage over the country, due to external intervention.

Despite positive contributions, as we have seen, an Ethiopian incursion into Somali territory may have been unwise. Ethiopia, a majority-Christian nation, and Somalia, a majority-Muslim country, have clashed a number of times since Somalia’s independence in 1960. The attacks may most likely strengthen al-Shabaab’s support and recruitment capabilities, since it was this nationalist sentiment towards the 2006 Ethiopian invasion, which led to the group’s astonishing growth in strength, influence and numbers.

The nationalist-religious fight against the ‘enemy’

As opposed to the ICU leaders, many of the Wahabi militants decided to stay and fight as part of al-Shabaab. The group immediately enforced a much stricter version of Sharia law than the one practiced by the members of the ICU. In addition, the lack of an effective government meant that typical governmental functions (maintain law and order through police, courts, and provide welfare) were carried out by al-Shabaab, mostly in the South (the region where the group’s presence is stronger), a factor which indeed contributed for the rise of support for the movement, even by some clan leaders themselves (Rob Wise, 2011).

Moreover, the invasion led al-Shabaab to opt for a nationalist strategy, “as the majority of Somalis were fixated not on religious struggle but on driving the Ethiopians from their country” (Rob Wise, P.5). In fact, while adhering to the al-Qaeda network, the group did not give up on its nationalist claims. Sarah Childress (2010), citing Roger Middleton (2010), argues that “the thing that gives al-Shabaab its punch is its national agenda”. It is these nationalist claims that help recruiting new militants, at the same time providing wider control over Somali territories.

Al-Shabaab also benefited from its relation with al-Qaeda. Christopher Harnisch (p.19) argues that “the statements by al-Qaeda’s top leaders in support of al-Shabaab have given al-Shabaab credibility and proven to be a valuable recruiting tool for attracting international fighters”. Nonetheless, the use of suicide bombs and attacks on civilians, a typical Modus Operandi by the international terrorist group, has damaged its image inside Somalia. Sarah Childress (2010) reports that “after a suicide bombing in December killed at least 19 people, most of them civilians, Somalis took to the streets in protest. Al-Shabaab initially denied any involvement. It later admitted the bomber had been an al-Shabaab fighter and a foreigner”.

Divisions within

Turning to the ‘inside politics’ of Al-Shabaab, experts say that the group is struggling with internal divisions between nationalist factions. A clear example is the internal division between the clan-based militia leaders who, according to Bruton and Pham (p.2) “are mainly determined to oust the TFG and put their own clans in power”, the likes of which “count upwards of 7,000 in their (clan-based militias) ranks”, comprising the majority of the al-Shabaab’s militants. Moreover,

As Ken Menkhaus (p. 3) argues, there is wide resistance to Islamic extremists posed by armed groups organized around clans and even around Islamic belief, the likes of which actively resisted al-Shabaab’s advances in Mogadishu. The author further argues that this resistance is a sign that, as Ethiopia pulled back in 2009, al-Shabaab lost the moral imperative for population support, since that ‘moral imperative’ from which the group originated – fight the ‘other’, the ‘foreign invader’ – had simply vanished.

An article in The Economist (Anonymous, 2012) strenghtens the argument that clan-based opposition is growing by saying that Clans are “entrenching themselves in their respective areas” – Somaliland, dominated by the Isak clan; Puntland, dominated by a sub-clan of the Darodclan; Galmudug under a feudal lord; Jubaland, in the southernmost region; and the pirates control the coastal area from Eyl to Haradheere. It is against their interests to be ruled by a religiously-led organization, while it can hold on to a its traditional territory being the higher authority.

Economist, 2012

Regarding opposition around Islamism, one of the main divisions within al-Shabaab is the indecision towards which path to choose: “one camp sees the group’s path as following that of other al-Qaeda affiliates toward global jihad, while the other holds a more localized Islamist agenda in the establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia” (Zimmerman, 2012). In what concerns to opposition from main-stream Islam within Somalia, most Somalis do not share the strict Saudi Arabian-inspired Wahabi interpretation of Islam which is the main ideology behind al-Shabaab. In fact, most Somalis are Sufi-Sunni Muslims, a moderate sect of Islam. The antagonization of Sufi Muslims led to an agreement signed between the Ahlu Sunnah Wal Jamahave (ASWJ), a paramilitary group comprised of Sufi Muslims in Somalia opposed to radical Islam, and the TFG on March 15, 2010. In a public show of its grievances towards radicals, the ASWJ stated that “these radical groups shed Muslim blood every day and they dig out and desecrate our graves. They are funded from outside and their Wahabi ideology is foreign and must be dealt with” (Mohamed Mohamed, 2009). The agreement established cooperation between the two parties in order to bring about a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Somalia. It would, in principle, allow the TFG government to expand its presence in the country.

Differences within the group may influence the splintering into a number of factions, giving rise to new groups and movements inside al-Shabaab, which in turn may or not prolong Somalia’s perilous situation. In other words, this situation may lead to the establishment of other organizations with the same characteristics, as the world’s attention shifts to other places in the world convinced that religious extremism in Somalia is defunct (Zimmerman, 2012). On the other hand, it also has the potential to benefit the government and groups fighting al-Shabaab, as the group becomes weaker and weaker. In fact, the nationalist faction can work as “influential spoilers or peacemakers in any emergent political order” (Ibrahim, 2010).

In addition, the growing influx of foreign jihadists since the group linked up with Al-Qaeda, can also pose a threat to the survival of Al-Shabaab. Bruton (p. 16) supports this claim by saying that “previous attempts by jihadist groups to govern Somalia have foundered against the Somalis’ hostility to restrictive, non-Somali religious edicts and the inability of foreigners to operate within the clan system”. In this way, it is probable that it may revive clan loyalties within al-Shabaab, thus spurring tensions. However, al-Shabaab has proved, up to this day, to be resilient and effective in moderating such loyalties.

Wars unavoidably bring misery, death and starvation with it. In the case of Somalia things have not been different. Although the United Nations have declared that famine in Somalia is over, it estimates that 2.3 million people – 31 percent of the Somali population – are still in a situation of food crisis (Jeffrey Gettleman, 2011). As the situation deteriorated in the country, al-Shabaab military and territorial losses, like the retreat from the Bakara market, the capital’s main trading hub, meant the lost of a major source of revenue for the group (Xan Rice, 2011). Coupled with this, a severe drought struck region, severed by the two-decade-long internal war and by al-Shabaab’s unwillingness to allow humanitarian aid organizations to enter the areas under its control. Al-Shabaab’s failure to make food and water available for the Somali population under its control is making it widely unpopular      amongst the populace.

Conclusion

The circumstances of the conflict between al-Shabaab and the TFG changed completely in 2006. It took a few days for the situation to change from an overwhelming domination by the al-Shabaab over the TFG into a total retreat by the group as soon as Ethiopia came into play. On the other side, this is a conflict that started as regular warfare and became a guerrilla/terrorist type.

Along with territorial and military losses came the dwindling of the groups’ revenues. The local alliances and constant defectors also meant loosing financial and people’s support. Moreover, the Ethiopia’s withdrawal in 2009 led to a further loss of people’s support. And with the lack of people’s support, the task of recruiting militants may become harder.

Therefore, the only solution found to keep al-Shabaab on the surface and avoid it to drown in Somalia’s crisis was for it to look for other sources of financing and support. It was finally provided by the ‘most wanted’ terrorist group in the world, Al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda’s support managed to provide al-Shabaab with the necessary skills and know-how to perform terrorist attacks and also an increased ability to lure foreign militants. However, it further diminished Somali support for it as the majority of the population do not see the radical view of Islam as the true Muslim belief. Abdi Elmi and Aynte(2012) argue that “Al-Shabaab has alienated the Somali people with its assassinations, attacks against innocent civilians, and poor management of last year’s famine.”

Despite having perpetrated attacks abroad, al-Shabab has largely turned its attention towards within its borders. In other words, as Bruton and Pham (2012) argue, the group has “invested more in the nationalist goal of removing AMISOM and the TFG from Mogadishu than in fighting a war with the rest of the world”. Notwithstanding, the danger of the movement to spread further across borders or entering in deeper cooperation with other foreign terrorist groups, is present and should not be ignored.

Afyare Abdi Elmi and Abdi Aynte (2012)argue that the international community should focus on reconciliation with the rebels and rely less on military action intending to crush them.This approach would, according to the authors, provide a chance to engage and reach a compromise with senior figures of al-Shabaab that are willing to negotiate with the government.

Recommendations:

To the US and the International Community:

• The nationalist branch of al-Shabaab should be dealt with: this branch has the implementation of an Islamic state in Somalia as their main goal, opposed to a global Jihad defended by the radical Islamic branch (Bruton and Pham, 2012). This interaction could lead to an agreement between the TFG and nationalist leaders, culminating in a cessation of hostilities from the part of some of those leaders, and safeguarding the integration of these leaders in a possible future inter-clan agreement.

• The Somali Diaspora, which has been one of the main sources of finance to al-Shabaab and a relevant source of militants, should be part of the strategy in order to discourage such actions.

• Promote a type of Federal system: A single sovereign state seems unlikely to be achieved. Therefore, in trying to stabilize Somalia one should interact with clan leaders and promote a federation-type of state. As it is said in an article by the magazine The Economist (Anonymous, 2012), rather than put their faith in the new internationally recognised government, whose writ extends barely beyond Mogadishu, despite recent advances, one should be aware that the various regional leaders have spoken for the creation of a somewhat federal system.

• Develop and modernize Somali national forces: part of the tragic events since independence tells the world that a foreign force cannot peacefully be in Somali territory for long. Therefore, as the country cannot afford the immediate withdrawal of AMISOM – it would only benefit al-Shabaab -, the decision issued by the UN mandate extension “to assist the Transitional Federal Government in the development of the Somali Police Force and the National Security Force” must be a high priority, as Elmi and Aynte (2012) also state.

To Ethiopia and Kenya:

• Withdraw their force: There is danger that the same nationalist sentiment that formed al-Shabaab may reappear, thus reinforcing the group or even creating other resistance groups.

 

Additional Information:

• Agreement between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and Ahlu Sunna Waljama’a (2010). Available at: http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPO/100315%20-%20Agreement%20bet%20TFG%20&%20ASWJ.pdf
• U.S. Department of State, 2008. Designation of al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Available at: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/102446.htm
• African Union Mission in Somalia, 2012. AMISOM Mandate. Available at: http://amisom-au.org/about/amisom-mandate/
• United Nations mandate extension:Security Council Extends Mandate of African Union Mission in Somalia until 31 October 2012, Adopting Resolution 2010 (2011). United Nations Security Council.

Bibliography:

• Abdi Elmi, A., and Aynte, A., 2012. Negotiating an End to Somalia’s War with al-Shabaab. Foreign Affairs.

• Agence France-Presse, 2012. Terror groups: al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab officially merge: Zawahiri. National Post.

• Anonymous, 2012. Somalia’s future: A ray of hope. The Economist.

• Bill Roggio, 2011. Somalia’s Shabaab vows allegiance to new al Qaeda emir Zawahiri. The Long War Journal.

• Bruton, B., 2010. Somalia: A New Approach. Council on Foreign Relations. Available at:

• Bruton, B., and Pham J., P., 2012. The Splintering of Al-Shabaab. Foreign Affairs.

• Childress, S., 2010. Somalia’s Al-Shabaab to ally with Al-Qaeda. The Wall Street journal.

• David Childs, 2005. In the Spotlight: al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI).

• Floyd K., 2010. Somalia’s Stability and Security Situation in Review. International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research.

• Gettleman, J., 2011. Somalis Waste Away as Insurgents Block Escape From Famine. The New York Times.

• Harnisch, C., 2010. The Terror Threat from Somalia: The Internationalization of al-Shabaab, Critical threats.

• Ibrahim, M., 2010. In Somalia, Signs of Discord Appear in a Militant group. The New York Times.

• Menkhaus, K., 2009. Somalia After the Ethiopian Occupation: First steps to end the conflict and combat extremis, ENOUGH.

• Meredith M., 2006. The State of Africa. Sydney: Free Press

• Mohamed, M., 2009. Somali rage at grave desecration. BBC News.

• NEFA Foundation, 2008. “Shabaab al-Mujahideen” announces new campaign of terrorism in Somalia.

• Pan-African News Wire, 2009. Al-Shabab Overruns Baidoa; Parliament Expanded; AU Forces Vow to Fire Back.

• Plaut, M., 2007. Ethiopia in Somalia: One year on. London: BBC News.

• Rice, X., 2008. Suicide attacks kill dozens in Somalia. The Guardian.

• Rice, X., 2011. Somali troops move to secure Mogadishu as rebels pull out. The Guardian.

• Rob Wise, 2011. Al Shabaab. Washington D.C: Centre for Strategic & International Studies.

• Zimmerman, K., 2012. Al-Shabaab in Decline? Critical Threats.

Nigeria: Why the 2015 elections may turn out to be bloody

Source: VOA News

In the run up to the 2011 general elections, many magazines and newspapers predicted that the Presidential elections scheduled for April 2011 would be very violent. A month later, the outcome was about a thousand persons, mainly youths between the ages of 18 and 25, massacred by irate supporters of General Muhammad Buhari, the main challenger of President Goodluck Jonathan in the presidential run-up. Although the Federal Government established a Committee to look into the causes of the 2011 post-election crisis, the masterminds were never brought to justice – portraying the existent dominant ‘culture of impunity’ in Nigeria. In simple words, some people in Nigeria are above the law.

Once again the most populous nation in Africa is on the march to another general election; and from all indications, the 2015 polls may yet become the bloodiest in the political history of Nigeria. The rumblings within the ruling party over the one term agreement – purportedly signed by the incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan, – and the utterances of some members of the opposition, disgruntled with the widespread corruption, the economic and social situation, the growing insecurity across the country, enhanced by their greed for power and the inherent material benefits associated with holding the higher political offices in the country, leave no one in doubt that post election violence is imminent for 2015.

 

The infighting in the PDP

Some governors from the ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP), mainly the ones from the North, have been alleging that President Jonathan, a southerner from the volatile oil-rich Niger Delta, signed an agreement to serve as President for only one term and not to seek re-election in 2015, giving a free-way for a Northern candidate to replace him . However, it appears that the President is not willing to honour the pact if at all it existed.

It has been widely discussed and rumoured that the Northern faction within the PDP, which strongly supported Jonathan’s re-election in 2011, might withdraw support for the incumbent President in favour of a Northern Muslim candidate. Apart from the ‘one-term agreement’ issue there are other factors which indicate such outcome: the widespread corruption and religious violence are alienating Nigerians, mostly northerners, who witness lack of economic development, high levels of unemployment, lack of positive future perspectives and the failure by government in protecting the lives of innocent civilians. All of this is fed with the will by Northern politicians to allocate political power once again to the North, thus feeding private interests of politicians, and thus gaining power over economic affairs and collecting material benefits – since independence political office has been closely linked to attaining economic/materia benefits in Nigeria.

The danger of the infighting within the ruling party may play out as follows. If the President is forced out of office unceremoniously by the Northern governors, his kinsmen may resume their militancy in the creeks at the level witnessed in the last decade. Such development will definitely scale down, or even shut-down,Nigeria’s oil production which, in turn, will inevitably slow down and cripple the economy of the country. As a result, the federal government may be forced to send in troops to the Niger Delta in order to quell the rebellion, in the same way as the military dictatorship that preceded the 1999 re-instating of democracy in the country did. If so the situation may unravel.

 

The South answers back

Niger Delta militants have been appeased by a fragile amnesty – in its essence a buy-off – which has of late been weakened, giving rise to renewed criminal activities. In addition, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), an umbrella group made up of several ethnically-formed smaller groups in the region, about which experts differ regarding if it is still active or if it is now a defunct organization working solely as an idea, has recently expressed its resentment towards Federal Government’s (FG) intention to consider granting amnesty to Boko Haram (BH), the Muslim militant group, which has been attacking Christians and Muslims alike – according to media and government sources, the death toll is already over one thousand. MEND has threatened to pay in the same coin, i.e., by bombing mosques and killing innocent Muslims. As a matter of fact, reprisals of this kind have already been reported in Kaduna.

Moreover, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), the separatist Igbo-dominated organization, may feel tempted to take advantage of the situation and speeds its way towards declaring the creation of the Republic of Biafra. After the March 18 2013, bombings at a bus car park in Kano, which killed many people – the bulk of the victims were Christians – MASSOB declared that tolerance was running out and if violence towards their kin continues, action must be taken.

Now, this sort of action would most likely be to attack and expel Muslims from the South-East. Such development, alike MEND’s threat, would only enrage Muslims and, in a way legitimize BH’s actions in the eyes of Muslim Northerners, politicians and civilians.

Therefore, to see Goodluck Jonathan being replaced by a Muslim candidate, coupled with forgiving thoughts towards BH, regardless of their bloody activities towards a specific target (the bulk of its victim have been Christians), might bring memories of the path to the Nigerian Civil-War, in which thousands of Christians, mainly Igbo ethnics, were targeted by civilian mobs and national security agencies all across Nigeria. Those memories will specially affect MASSOB members, thus proving to be a sort of ‘wake-up call’ to Southerners, namely from the South-South and South-East.

An explosive mixture can result from this events. With dwindling oil revenues and its armed forces fighting in seven states in the North and also on two fronts in the creeks and rainforest regions of the south, Nigeria may yet be facing the greatest threat to its existence as a single unified country since the Nigerian Civil-War almost half a century ago.

 

The Buhari Factor and Opposition Candidates

In the event that PDP high officials are able to settle their differences and present President Goodluck Jonathan as their Presidential candidate, and if the massive killings by Boko Haram do not provoke violent ‘pay-back’ by the Southerners, the greatest threat to Nigeria becomes the speculative main challenger of the incumbent President. Every sign points out that General Muhammadu Buhari – who ruled the country between 1983 and 1985 – will be the challenger, backed by the recently formed mega-party, the All Progressive Congress (APC), resulting from the merge by the main four opposition parties – representing the South-East, South-West and North. This despite the fact that the APC is still divided on who to support for the elections.

General Muhammadu Buhari has made it clear that any future elections failing in electing him as President will be inevitably flawed, irrespective of whether such elections are considered free and fair by the National Electoral Commission (NEC), over which the former military ruler seems to have no confidence. Thus it would be difficult to see how he would accept any result from that body.

Moreover, with millions of die-hard fanatics of his, the former strongman seems very confident of getting his way. Otherwise, according to him, Nigeria risks an Arab spring of some sort. In 2012, Buhari gave a dire warning of what would happen in 2015: ”If what happened in 2011 (alleged rigging) should again happen in 2015, by the grace of God, the dog and the baboon would all be soaked in blood”. The General’s statement is very obvious. Therefore, one can conclude that, if Buhari is not elected there will be a bloody revolution, likely to trigger anarchy among the political elite.

Nigerians should brace up for the worst in case Buhari is not elected. To make things worse, General Buhari is not the only politician making threats. Lai Mohammed, Dino Melaye , Ahmad Yerima are among many who have threatened violence one way or the other. And as if to buttress their threats some politicians are stockpiling arms in huge quantities, while some are courting favour from Boko Haram.

We might see once again crowds engaging in communal and even inter-ethnic/religious violence. Politicians, in the same way as they did in previous elections, will use their favourite method of gaining power: what Chinua Achebe defines as the ‘rent-a-crowd’ method. In other words, impoverished youths, mostly in the North, are paid and armed by politicians, with the goal to attack opposing sides and thus provide politicians with increased leverage and power over others. This is where Boko Haram comes into play; it has the man-power and luring capacity, which makes it a powerful ally for any northern politician who wants to surpass others in the political marathon.

 

 

Chimamanda Adichie: The danger of a single story

Since the Europeans embarked on the colonialist enterprise, culminating with the Scramble for Africa, there has been a single exclusive definition of sub-Saharan Africa and its continent. The Black Africa was considered to be a place of immense riches, vast natural wealth and an uncivilized people that needed to assimilate a monotheistic religion in order to be ‘saved’ (in this case, I am also referring to the spread of Islam southwards onto the Black continent).

This is a stigma that, unfortunately, endured through most of the twentieth century, and is still very present across non-sub-Saharan African minds.

The Scramble for Africa disregarded the multiplicity of different African identities, solely aiming at benefiting European interests. Besides being considerate uncivilized and barbaric, Black Africans were considered not to have any kind of culture. Chinua Achebe, the late famous Nigerian writer, has persistently pointed out that such argument became a tool to justify the European civilizational role in Africa, something which would ‘save’ African souls and improve their livelihoods, bringing them out of a world of ignorance and darkness.

Serious implications derived from this. Look at the case of the Rwandan Genocide: it was thought by the International System, i.e., United Nations, that what was occurring in that small, land-locked, African country, was just one more civil-war, in the same way that many others happened, and where happening, in Africa. In this case, the ‘single story’ of the Black African being ignorant and inferior to the White man, coupled with colonial politics in Rwanda by the Germans and then Belgians, created two different social classes who began attacking each other has soon as Europeans left in the mid-twentieth century. Linked to this is the fact that Rwandans kept with the single story created by the former colonial masters. Rwandans failed to produce a different story of its people, some other story which would portray the culture of its people and its pre-colonial identity.

Unfortunately, this is something which is spread across the continent. From Nigeria, through Congo, all the way to South Africa.

The idea that Africa must behave according to Western (or any other non-African) standards is wrong. It only serves to maintain Africans in obscurity and ignorance.

This is exactly what Chimamanda Adichie, a Nigerian novelist, talks about in her TED Talk, ‘The danger of a single story’. She defines it as: “show a people as one thing, as only one thing, over and over again, and that is what they become.”

Going further into the Talk, Chimamanda uses the Igbo word Nkali, which roughly means ‘to be greater than another’, adding that stories too are defined by the principle of Nkali. In other words, “How they (stories) are told, who tells them, when they are told, how many stories are told – are really dependent on power.”

“Power is the ability not just to tell the story of another person, but to make it the definitive story of that person.”

Quoting a Palestinian author, Chimamanda argues that the best way to dispossess a people is to start with ‘secondly’: “Start the story with the arrows of the native Americans, and not with the arrival of the British, and you have an entirely different story. Start the story with the failure of the African states, and not with the colonial creation of the African State, and you have an entirely different story.”

More awareness must be fomented across Black African populations if they are to be totally emancipated from Western prejudices, and from the single stories that dominate the continent and the minds of its people.

Hope seems to be fading for the DRC

The U.N. Security Council has unanimously approved the creation and deployment of an ‘intervention brigade’, in Congo. Such a ‘intervention brigade’, under Resolution 2098(2013) “Enables ‘Offensive’ Combat Force to ‘Neutralize and Disarm’ Congolese Rebels, Foreign Armed Groups.

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been under upheaval and conflict since its independence, and continuous attempts to stabilize the country have failed. More recently, peace negotiations broke down between the 23 March Movement – most commonly known as M23 rebels – , who have been making important advances in Eastern Congo, threatening to go all the way to the country’s capital and overthrow the regime, and the Congolese Government, resulting in renewed hostilities.

This Resolution may be said to come at a time of despair and hopelessness. For the first time in the history of the United Nations, the Security Council has authorized an offensive force to be deployed, breaking up with the usual ‘normal’ of establishing peace-keeping forces. This force is free, under the mandate extension, to carry out “offensive operations, either unilaterally or jointly with the Congolese armed forces”.

Furthermore, the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) was extended until March 31 2014. Bearing this in consideration, the Resolution establishes that the Council could extend it, depending on its performance, and also depending on the DRC’s progress in implementing the Peace and Security Framework for the region (February 24, 2013):

• “To continue, and deepen security sector reform, particularly with respect to the Army and Police;
• - To consolidate State authority, particularly in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including to prevent armed groups from destabilizing neighbouring countries;
• - To make progress with regard to decentralization;
• - To further economic development, including with respect to the expansion of infrastructure and basic social service delivery;
• - To further structural reform of Government institutions, including financial reform; and
• - To further the agenda of reconciliation, tolerance and democratization.”

The Resolution also states that it will not create a precedent. Some speakers expressed their reservations during the vote, regarding this issue. Other reservations, namely related to the UN’s impartial stance, were also expressed. Nevertheless, the Resolution was passed unanimously.

Furthermore, the Congolese Representative, Raymond Tshibanda N’tungamulongon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed his countries’ gratitude for the UN’s efforts in helping to protect Congolese territorial integrity.

 

Analysis:

Should we applaud such a decision by the United Nations Security Council?

Let us start with the brigade’s composition. It is official protocol for the U.N. Peacekeeping Department to ask U.N. Member states to contribute troops. It is at the same time a most difficult task, since not every U.N. Member has the financial and human availability for such enterprises. Notwithstanding, the DRC is a country that, due to its vast natural wealth, has been ravaged by its neighbours’ interests – Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, among others. Rwanda is the most relevant one, bearing in mind the conflict – and genocide – that took place between Hutus and Tutsis. The government of Rwanda – post-genocide – played a major role on Mobutu’s, and later Laurent-Desiré Kabila, overthrow from power. In addition, there has been speculation that the Rwanda regime has been profiting from illegal mineral extraction in Eastern Congo – also used to sponsor Congolese rebels. As a result of the attractiveness the DRC presents, it might not be so hard a task to fulfil the requirements for the “intervention brigade”.

Moreover, we will likely see non-western countries, and exclusively African ones being part of the new force in the DRC under the U.N. auspices. This has been the trend lately in Africa, and the AU is deeply committed in guaranteeing its own security. In the end, following this logic, it will probably be relatively easy to gather the required amount of troops and resources, since having a military contingent within a country’s border is a gateway for in the near future to play a part in its ‘reconstruction’.

There is one recent example which shows exactly that: Kenyan and Ethiopian troops have been in Somalia for the past years in order to help tackle al-Shabaab and allow for a Somali Government to be installed. Such a military intervention was later ‘blessed’ by the U.N. However, even after the first Somali government in 20 years was installed, Kenyan and Ethiopian troops are still very present in Somalia and it is widely known that they are playing an influential role in Somali politics (as they historically have done for the last century). Therefore, to allow for a country to establish ‘legal’ presence in one other, is the same as someone giving a slice of your cake to someone else without even asking you, nor expecting one in return.

 

Second of all, and linked to the previous paragraph, is the time length. The mandate is supposed to last until March 31 2014, and is susceptible to be extended, depending on the force’s and government’s performance. If I understood it right, if the offensive force successfully targets the rebels, and the DRC government shows progress in extending its authority across the country, decentralizing its power, promoting economic development and providing welfare, and also if it implements political, economic and financial reforms, the mandate will be over within the timeline proposed. How likely is it that such goals will be achieved?

The Congo is roughly the size of Western Europe, it is mainly constituted of tropical jungles, with sparse road accesses. The DRC has an estimated population of 71 million, whereas Western Europe has close to 400 million. The majority of Congolese population is poorly educated, 65% live in rural areas, and are under widespread poverty. In the East, where the conflict is going on between government forces and rebels, thousands of people are displaced and have nowhere to go. Furthermore, the M23 rebels, based in the East, are allegedly supported by Rwanda and Uganda. Such a circumstance may define the relations the “intervention brigade’ might develop with M23′s leadership.

An ‘intervention brigade’ consisting of “three infantry battalions, one artillery and one special forces and reconnaissance company head-quartered in Goma” will have to juggle with the warm tropical weather, the thick jungle, and lack of decent roads for transport purposes. On the other side of the battlefield they will have groupings which know the field, something which gives a tremendous advantage to the rebels. Adding to this, the alleged support – in financial and military equipment terms – by other regional powers (Uganda and Rwanda), might guarantee a discreet and steady flow of resources onto rebel hands. Furthermore, the low population density in turn provides the rebels with more space to act and base their operations. Countering the international public perception of the events, the rebels are not gathered under one umbrella. There are other rebel groups acting across Eastern Congo – not all of them are part nor swear allegiance to M23 -, making it more difficult for the intervention force to operate. As a result, it is highly unlikely that the “intervention brigade’ will manage to give an instantaneous blow on the rebels. Thus, the U.N. force seems to be doomed to fail in accomplishing its immediate goals, making an extension all the more likely.

In what concerns to the DRC government, is it going to manage to abide by its commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework? Well, let’s see.
The DRC government faces the same difficulties the new intervention force will face. The territory is too large, too empty of people and too rough in order to effectively tackle rebel groups, as well to provide services. The population is uneducated and lives under a self-sufficiency base, with little knowledge of how politics work, or even who is holding power. Regarding decentralization, under the calamitous and dangerous situation the DRC is experiencing, decentralization would be seen as a gift to rebel groups. Decentralization without development, accountability and growth, does only spur self-determination feelings. Such self-determination feelings might be fed (and feed) by rebels who intend to implement an alternative to the DRC’s current regime.

As a result, the mandate might be extended for at least another year, or more if it goes accordingly other wars waged by an association of nations against one country.

 

Third, the ‘danger of precedent-creation’. This is probably the point which has the most implication for International Relations. By intervening in the DRC, with the goal to promote government’s sovereignty across the country and to end the atrocities and human rights violations, the United Nations are opening the way by calls for further help by other countries. Is the United Nations Security Council prepare to act once again unanimously regarding an international security issue?

The United Nations Security Council has now to choose which path to follow. Will it risk approving every single request for help? Will it risk initiating offensive military operations in every corner of the world? Moreover, what is the Criteria for intervening? Is there going to be established two kinds of human right violations – the tolerable and the intolerable? What will happen when one other nation which is witnessing human rights violations being committed within its border, sees help denied? Wouldn’t the U.N. be labelled biased? Wouldn’t the U.N. see its credibility weakened even further?

 

In sum, the U.N.’s new mandate to the MONUSCO might turn out to be a great mistake in the long-term. The great war for Congo that has lasted for decades – despite few interruptions – will go up a level, meaning that the great war will give place to a new Scramble for the heart of Africa – and with it a massive increase in casualties -, as the ‘intervention brigade’ establishes itself within the territory. Regional forces will take the chance and attempt to entrench their influence and power under the auspices of the United Nations – and paradoxically legitimized by it.

This new Scramble has every chance to result in a mass scale regional war, which the U.N. Security Council will have to face, and with it think on other solutions to the conflict. And why not consider some kind of Congolese partition into smaller units? It might be extremely complex, risky and conflict prone, but it would for sure settle some issues – and give rise to others – and, probably, lead to less conflict in the region. Nonetheless this is an issue to be further assessed in some other time.