Angola: Towards Supremacy in Sub-Saharan Africa?

Introduction

Headed since independence by the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), the Angolan government has pursued domestic goals, such as internal security and stability. During the Cold War, the government in Luanda allocated disproportionate resources to its foreign relations in a way to engage external allies in its favor and help Angola overcome the challenges across the volatile borders. Support from Cuba and the Soviet Union proved crucial for MPLA survival. On the other hand, support by the United States, Namibia and South Africa to the rebel União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA), posed a serious challenge to the MPLA regime.

The aftermath of the USSR demise in the early 1990’s and the end of the Angolan civil war in 2002 drove the MPLA-led regime to adjust its foreign relations to changed domestic, regional and international dynamics. Changes in the neighborhood’s political environment – namely in former Zaire, Namibia, the Republic of Congo, and South Africa – deprived Angola’s rebels of fundamental support, meaning that the MPLA was free to consolidate its power and build foundations capable of delivering rapid economic growth, political stability and social cohesion. As part of the changed dynamics, Angola boosted its engagement with China so as to take advantage of the country’s economic growth and hunger for resources. China provided large quantities of capital and specialized labor that Angola desperately needed for its post-war reconstruction, and also to achieve high levels of economic growth. Unlike the West, China does not require good governance and transparency as a condition for economic cooperation and investment, a fact that eased and accelerated this relationship.

The MPLA regime has to satisfy Angolan’s desire for economic growth and development, as well as the patronage system at the core of political stability, if it is to maintain social cohesion and the political status quo. If protests and opposition rallies, driven by popular dissatisfaction towards the authoritarian and corrupt nature of the regime, gain strength and become more frequent, it will endanger the country’s stability and possibly threaten the regime’s survival. In order to prevent domestic pressures from escalating into wider instability1 the government has to create jobs, expand its economic and political clout throughout Africa, and engage with more mature democracies – namely in the West – as a way of satisfying domestic demands for less corruption, better governance, and greater transparency.2 With these goals in mind, Luanda has engaged in an active and constructive foreign policy, alongside a resilient economic expansion strategy.

Angola’s Economic Potential as a Foreign Policy Vehicle

Oil production comprises 95% of Angola’s exports, 46% of the country’s GDP, and 80% of government revenues.3 In less than a decade, Angola’s oil revenues transformed a war-torn African country into an economic power that intends to parlay growth into socioeconomic development and become less vulnerable to external shocks. With this in mind, the government has initiated attempts to diversify the economy, which is today the most concentrated economy in the world in terms of exports, after Iraq.4 Agriculture, which employs two-thirds of the population, is one of the targeted sectors. The country has 35 million hectares of arable land, of which only five million are currently under cultivation.5 The mineral sector, on the other hand, is seen as a potential major source of revenue and with great job creation prospects. Also, diamond mining accounts for 5% of GDP. The government wants to increase diamond production by up to 5%, encourage local stone-polishing, and create a jewelry market.6

The Angolan government is also looking to expand its presence towards the mineral riches in the Great Lakes and Southern Africa region, which implies rivaling South Africa. South Africa has setup a transport and supply network encompassing Botswana, the DRC, Zambia and Zimbabwe, making these countries reliant on the port of Durban to export their mineral output. In face of this challenge, Angola is developing new infrastructure that may change transportation across Southern Africa. A deepwater port at Lobito with a new bulk ore terminal has been rebuilt, a 200,000 barrel-a day oil refinery is being set up, and a railway system that will link the Atlantic coast of Angola to the eastern border – which is projected to reach the mineral-rich Katanga province, in the DRC, and the copperbelt province, in Zambia – has been reopened.7

In fact, the re-opened 1,344-kilometer Caminho de Ferro de Benguela (CFB) is the shortest rail line connecting Congolese mining interests to international markets. China has invested US$6 billion in the 600-kilometer rail from the Katanga province to the border town of Dilolo where it will link with the CFB.8 Furthermore, in Zambia the construction of a railway connecting the rich copperbelt province to the CFB is expected to start before the end of 2014.9 Lobito will therefore become the logical place to export minerals from Zambia and the DRC, placing Angola on the right path to create its own mineral trade network and allowing the country to compete with South Africa in the lucrative sector. Going forth, Angola is also attempting to project its oil-producing capacity onto its neighborhood. In April 2012, Luanda and Lusaka signed a US$2.5 billion dollar Memorandum of Understanding for the construction of a 1,400-kilometer petroleum pipeline to connect Lobito to the Zambian capital, which is slated for completion in 2016.10 Adding to this, in 2013 Luanda committed itself to supply Zambia with refined petroleum products.11

Luanda does not limit its actions to the Great Lakes region and Southern Africa. The Gulf of Guinea is a major shipping transit region for world trade that is also rich in natural resources. Angola has been investing in the Gulf countries – particularly in Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, and São Tomé e Príncipe – in areas such as infrastructures, mining and oil exploration, in a way to boost its influence across this strategic area. In 2012 Sonangol bought 51% of São Tomé’s airline, STP. Angola has also opened a US$180 million credit line to São Tomé and has a participation in the country’s fuel, ports and airports sectors.12 Furthermore, in 2011 Angola and the Republic of Congo signed an agreement for the joint-exploration of oil and gas in the Lianzi field, which is located within the two countries’ maritime borders. Negotiations are still ongoing and exploration is expected to begin in 2015.13 Luanda’s support for Guinea-Bissau’s security sector reform (SSR) and fragile government, prior to the 2012 coup, was largely aimed at guaranteeing bauxite exploration projects owned by a Sonangol subsidiary and resurrecting the strategic port of Buba, through which the mineral would be shipped onto international markets.14 Nigeria, the continent’s largest economy and oil producer, is one of Angola’s greatest competitors, alongside South Africa. West Africa, which is Abuja’s main sphere of influence, encompasses Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and São Tomé, overlapping with Luanda’s own interests. To Angola’s benefit, Nigeria, which faces a number of internal threats, has failed to add political stability and social cohesion to economic growth. Luanda can therefore expand its interests across West African countries, capitalizing on Nigeria’s change of focus to national problems and consequent diminishing intervention in regional affairs. Instability in Nigeria may also drive foreign investments to focus on other African markets, of which Angola is one of the most attractive. In addition, despite obstacles to increasing oil production in the near term, Luanda may become sub-Saharan Africa’s largest oil producer by 2020.15

Economic diversification and expansion of Luanda’s economic sphere will not only spur economic growth, create jobs and feed private ambitions, but also provide Angola with the chance to go beyond the status of important petro-partner16 and gain greater leverage to project influence across borders. Oil will play an increasing role in promoting Luanda’s rise, namely through the national oil company Sonangol, the country’s foreign policy spearhead. In fact, Luanda’s financial liquidity is a powerful soft power tool, meaning that strong economic participation in other African countries allows the Angolan regime to have a say in their national politics, in particular whenever Luanda’s interests are ignored or violated.

Still, Luanda needs hard power to achieve regional prominence. To that end, the country is asserting itself as a military player in an Africa that lacks professional and capable national armed forces. Driven by oil revenues, Luanda’s military budget has surpassed that of South Africa, leaping 175% since 2004. Angola has become the largest military spender in sub-Saharan Africa.17 Considering the huge investment in military capacity and Luanda’s historical use of its armed forces as a foreign policy tool to project the country’s influence and power,18 one might expect occasional action when the country’s interests are threatened.

In order for all of Luanda’s projects and ambitions to become reality it is imperative that Angola does the utmost to build rapport with its neighbors, while also guaranteeing peace and stability across the region. With this in mind, Luanda should promote cultural and commercial interactions between border communities, foment positive and constructive official engagement with other countries’ authorities – either bilaterally or within the aegis of regional organizations –, and show active commitment to strengthen the region’s security environment. Angola’s porous and volatile borders need to be secured, and that can only be achieved via a ‘good neighborhood policy’. In brief, a policy focused on promoting a good neighborhood is the pillar that sustains Angola’s ambitions and prevents the country’s rising edifice from crumbling.

The Assertion of a Committed African Leadership

In January 2014, President José Eduardo dos Santos took over the biennial presidency of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), promising to work “for peace, stability and economic and social development”.19 A few weeks later, in a visit to the ICGLR’s headquarters in Burundi, Angolan Minister of Foreign Affairs Georges Chikoti announced the release of funds aimed at making the ICGLR more efficient and proactive. Also relevant was the visit to Luanda, in February 2014, by UN Secretary-General Special Envoy to the Great Lakes Region Mary Robinson following a meeting with DRC President, Joseph Kabila, in Kinshasa. The visit to the DRC took place when of the announcement of a Presidential amnesty to the M23 former rebels. In Luanda, Robinson expressed satisfaction at the meeting with President José Eduardo dos Santos, in his capacity as chair of the ICGLR, and over his commitment to actively support regional peace and stability.20 Catherine Samba-Panza, interim President of the Central African Republic (CAR), visited Luanda in May 2014 with the aim of guaranteeing aid and support for the conflict-ridden country. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding whereby Luanda pledged US$10 million in humanitarian aid and support to the country’s security forces and new political authorities.21 Later, in June 2014 President José Eduardo dos Santos called for the international community to strengthen humanitarian aid and deploy a peacekeeping force to the CAR, in line with the Security Council’s resolution.22 Around the same time, the Angolan President summoned two important African politicians to Luanda in order to discuss ways to strengthen security in the region: Denis Sassou-Nguesso, head of the Libreville Accord Follow-up Committee for peace and stability in the CAR, and Idriss Déby Itno, chairman of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).23

Luanda knows that instability in the neighboring DRC may trigger new threats. Considering this, Luanda has engaged with key regional actors. In May Rwanda, which has regularly intervened in eastern DRC in order to suppress threats to its own stability and security, signed a cooperation framework with Angola that aims to defuse tensions and improve bilateral relations. Presidents José Eduardo dos Santos and Paul Kagame expressed their commitment to regional peace.24 The following day Angola and Uganda signed agreements aimed at boosting bilateral cooperation. The two sides also analyzed the security situation in the region with particular attention given to the M23 amnesty issue.25 Later in July, foreign and defense ministers of the ICGLR and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) met in Luanda and agreed to suspend military operations against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a rebel group operating in eastern Congo, for six months. Behind this decision is the intention to give the group more time to disarm.26 However, it is uncertain if international military action will be authorized in the event the group refuses to disarm.

Furthermore, although tensions in the oil-rich Cabinda enclave – the source of 65% of Angola’s oil production – are currently low, Luanda has engaged with neighboring countries in an attempt to minimize the prospects of a cross border crisis in the area. Angola and the Republic of Congo, on the one hand, agreed on the creation of two sub-commissions aimed at the attainment of better security and control of common maritime, fluvial and land boundary limits, alongside the oil and gas exploration deal mentioned earlier.27 Conversely, Luanda and Kinshasa have failed to reach a similar agreement over the region where Cabinda’s oil-blocks are located, the likes of which seriously restrict the DRC’s access to the sea. So, despite mutual recognition that an agreement is needed, rival demands have impeded it.28

Growing maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea calls for Luanda’s readiness to use military force, while requiring a committed engagement among regional countries, with an eye toward guaranteeing an unrestricted trade flow and, therefore, safeguarding Angolan oil exports – Angola, the second main oil exporter in the Gulf after Nigeria, relies on the Gulf to export its oil production onto international markets. Cooperation within the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC) – headquartered in Luanda29 – is therefore of vital importance. Luanda, as one of the most capable military powers in the region, can promote the GGC as a bridge between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and ECCAS, strengthening a comprehensive regional strategy that encourages the countries to act together. Overall, to devise a common agenda is of fundamental importance if regional instability is to be addressed.

A Point of Convergence for International Interests in the Region

Luanda’s scope of action is not limited to the Great Lakes, Southern Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. In fact, the MPLA has been widening alliances with a diverse array of non-African countries. Such geopolitical interaction reflects Luanda’s intention to attain greater international prestige, attract foreign investment and skilled workers, assert itself as an economic gateway to the region, and enter non-African markets. In short, Luanda is seeking to influence international engagement with the continent. The other side of the spectrum juggles between expanding commercial ties and promoting the region’s security environment as a means to advance their interests in the region. Angola has become a vital partner for those international actors seeking to have a stake in the promising African continent.

China’s strategy to Africa is exclusively aimed at reaching new markets and opportunities. In fact, Luanda is poised to be a major broker for China’s expansion in the Great Lakes region. In May 2014, just three days after a US delegation left the country, a Chinese delegation arrived in Angola to discuss cooperation agreements in the areas of infrastructure construction, agriculture and support for more Chinese investment.30 Concerning Brazil, the country’s interest in Angola falls mostly on strengthening economic cooperation, while not disregarding security in the region. Recently, the opening of a sixth credit line raised total of loans to Angola to US$7.83 billion.31 And apart from economic goals, in 2013 Angola and Brazil signed a military cooperation agreement aimed at developing the country’s armed forces and promote security across the South Atlantic. In addition, six military planes were already delivered and Brazilian authorities are analyzing the possibility of transferring technology to reduce Angola’s reliance on the exterior in terms of weaponry and logistics.32

Portugal’s strategy regarding Angola goes in line with that of Brazil. Portuguese private investment in Angola, in terms of small and medium enterprises, now only trails that of China. Nevertheless, Luanda is reversing the game by taking advantage of the economic and financial crisis in Portugal. Angola has already invested between €10 and €15 billion in Portugal, in areas as diverse as media, banking, building and agriculture.33 As a result, Luanda has found a gateway to the European market. Moreover, both countries maintain technical-military cooperation that focuses on training, logistical and administrative support to Angolan armed forces. The cooperation has allowed for the professionalization of the Angolan army and contributed to the subordination of the Angolan armed forces to political power.34 Both countries are in the process of expanding cooperation to areas such as communications, information systems, and maritime and coastal control.35 Conversely, other countries are as much committed to advancing economic interests as to promoting security. In fact, for them these are deeply interdependent. In a trip to Angola this year, US Secretary of State John Kerry commended President José Eduardo dos Santos on his engagement in the peace process in the Great Lakes region. Bilateral trade, cooperation, human rights and good governance were also discussed. Kerry noted the role that Angola – one of America’s three strategic military partners in Africa, alongside Nigeria and South Africa – may have in promoting security in the region, in particular regarding the potential airlift of troops to CAR.36 President José Eduardo dos Santos has also been to France to promote Angola as a prime destination for trade and investment. During the visit, France, which has vital strategic interests in the Great Lakes region, recognized Angola as a regional anchor for peace and security. The two also discussed possible joint action in conflict resolution in Africa.37 Finally, Angola is regarded by Russian leaders as a strategic partner. Russia has provided support to modernize the Angolan armed forces, and both countries are also discussing ways to strengthen bilateral cooperation, including in the transport sector, staff training, and recognition of university diplomas.38

Despite playing a small role historically in peacekeeping missions, Luanda’s potential in mediating conflicts and promoting stability is widely recognized. As a matter of fact, the deployment of Angola’s capable armed forces to regional crisis zones promises tangible benefit to the international community. On the one hand, Angolan military action would compensate for the lack of men on the ground, in theory making international peacekeeping operations more capable, as it is often difficult to find countries willing to make troops and other military resources swiftly available. In addition, the West – namely France and the US – would also see a considerable share of the burden taken off its back. On the other hand, an ‘African solution for African problems’ would be attained, making accusations of western meddling less likely to be made. However, in a recent interview, the Angolan Minister of Foreign Affairs rejected the idea of deployment of Angolan troops to CAR.39 This position suggests that President José Eduardo dos Santos is unwilling to deploy the Angolan army under foreign command.

A Prudent, but Potentially Decisive, Regional Stabilizer

Unilateral Angolan intervention in crisis areas should not be ruled out because it is in Luanda’s strategic interests to guarantee peace and security inland and at sea. Yet, any joint African intervention is contingent on the protracted establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis (ACIRC), the likes of which are expected to be launched by 2015 and October 2014, respectively.40 Equally relevant is cooperation within the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) in terms of promoting security and stability. Despite being relatively active in the area of capacity building, the organization still lacks an institutionalized military cooperation, i.e. peacekeeping operations, that would propel its importance in the international arena. Although an institutionalized military cooperation within the CPLP will hardly materialize in the short-term, its potential should not be discounted. Portuguese-speaking countries not only have deep cultural and political ties, which in principle could ease consensus and cooperation, but they also share strategic interests in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, the CPLP comprises some of the world’s fastest growing economies – namely Angola, Brazil and Mozambique –, a fact that may enable the organization to play, in the foreseeable future, an increasingly important role in the continent’s economic and political environment. With this in mind, Angola can spearhead the development of CPLP’s capacity to promote security and stability, especially in Guinea-Bissau and around the Gulf of Guinea, and thus advance its national interests on another front.

Considering the likelihood that Angola will deploy troops on the ground soon is low, and finding ‘African solutions for African problems’ is a way off, the most efficient way to address instability in the region would be to draw on Angola’s post-war experience. Despite a 27-year civil war, Angola managed to become an African powerhouse and place itself among the most stable and peaceful countries in the continent. Inclusion of former opposition fighters into the government and economic sphere drove this success, and led to reconciliation. Even despite some setbacks in delivering on a few promises to former civil war fighters,41 few other African countries managed to be as effective in the armed forces’ transition as Angola.42 Over and above, a victor’s justice43 was never applied in Angola, in contrast to what happened in other post-war scenarios in Africa.

Angola is one of the few African countries that has managed to achieve high levels of financial liquidity – derived from oil revenues – while maintaining internal stability. Such an achievement provides Luanda with enough leeway to support other countries in need. That financial liquidity can be applied along the lines of the support given to the CAR, and also to make regional organizations more efficient and to contribute for the swift establishment of an African intervention force. Clearly, the task to stabilize troubled countries can be made easier if regional actors get together and actively commit to addressing instability. Considering this, Luanda can use its growing influence in the region to try to find a consensus that may serve all key regional actors. In fact, a consensus aimed at improving the political and security environment in the region is likely to have greater success if attained under the umbrella of regional organizations.

The Angolan regime may play an additional role in promoting stability. Using its growing status as an African powerhouse, and as a major economic and security partner, Luanda can push for the region’s interests in the international scene. That can be done without disregarding the principle of ‘finding African solutions for African problems’. Organizations like the World Bank, which had an important participation in Angola’s post-war reconciliation, can interact with Africa in an active manner, but according to regional dynamics and driven by African interests. In addition, a successful bid to join the UN Security Council as a non-permanent member for the 2015-2016 period will certainly give Luanda greater leverage within the international community to promote Angola’s interests, and hence those of the region and the continent.44

Conclusion

Angola’s remarkable post-war recovery and reconciliation, coupled with an immense oil wealth, was ingeniously transformed into an incisive and constructive foreign policy that, above all, aims at maintaining internal stability, both among the general population and the patronage system that has supported the regime. Internal stability is largely contingent on socio-economic development, job creation, economic diversification and economic expansion towards foreign markets. Still, Luanda has realized that economic power alone will not suffice. In order to guarantee internal stability, Luanda needs to minimize instability on its borders and in the region more broadly. Therefore, for Angola it is essential to go beyond projecting economic and political influence abroad, and accumulate hard power. In other words, soft power is a tool that can only yield results when backed up by hard power – military might and economic heft.

Angola’s oil-fed military investment drive has given rise to one of the most capable armed forces in sub-Saharan Africa, alongside Nigeria and South Africa. Having Angola’s hard power in consideration, President José Eduardo dos Santos’ ICGLR chairmanship and leading role in the GGC have been widely recognized by African and non-African actors as key to the region’s peace and stability. In particular, the acknowledgement that troubled countries in the Great Lakes can draw on Angola’s post-war experience as a model to follow, and also that the Gulf of Guinea can benefit from having Angola’s capable armed forces at its core, so as to assure smooth trade flows and overall security. Luanda now has enough interest and sway in the region to promote regional joint initiatives to foster peace, security and stability.

Such a capable country stands at the forefront of those entities with which international actors have to interact so as to better advance and protect their own interests in the continent. Hence, Angola has become a major partner that has to be engaged on any sort of matter in the region of the Great Lakes, Southern Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. Luanda’s rise in the region, in Africa, and on the international scene is certain. Notwithstanding, one should bear in mind that President José Eduardo dos Santos may be nearing the end of his 34-year rule, a fact that will possibly originate internal power disputes and even opposition-led social upheaval that may threaten the regime, and thus undermine the stable path that the country has taken since the end of the civil war.

(Endnotes)

  1. The political opposition has increasingly been protesting against the government’s violence and detention of opposition activists. See “Angola: Repressão Violenta de Protesto da Oposição” (Human Rights Watch, 26 November 2013) and “Angola” (Human Rights Watch).
  2. The West can equally provide investment, skills and know-how, all of which contribute to the realization of Angola’s ambition of becoming an African powerhouse.
  3. “Angola” (African Economic Outlook).
  4. “Angola Economic Update” (World Bank).
  5. “Angola with 35-million hectare arable surface” (Agência Angola Press, 18 November 2013).
  6. “Angola seeks to diversify its economy by developing mining sector” (Mining Weekly, 6 September 2013). 7 For a thorough analysis of the subject see “Angola’s Chinese-built rail link and the scramble to access the region’s resources” (Wits China-Africa Reporting Project, 26 February 2014).
  7. Ibid.
  8. “Grindrod, Northwest Rail Company team up on Zambian rail prospect” (Engineering News, 14 February 2014) 10 “Zambia and Angola sign $2.5bn Oil deal” (Lusaka Times, 16 April 2012)..
  9. “Angola fornece combustíveis à Zâmbia” (Jornal de Angola, 12 December 2013).
  10. “Angola boosts its influence in Sao Tome and Principe with credit line” (Macauhub, 27 January 2014).
  11. “Angola e Congo exploram petróleo” (Jornal de Angola, 6 June 2014).
  12. See “Guinea-Bissau Coup Puts Angolan Investments at Risk” (Think Africa Press, 13 April 2012).
  13. “Angola May Miss 2015 Oil-Output Target, Wood Mackenzie Says” (Bloomberg, 7 May 2014).
  14. Angola is China’s second largest crude-oil supplier, behind Saudi Arabia, while the European Union, the United
  15. States and India are also major oil clients. See “Angola” (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 5 February 2014). 17 See Sam Perlo-Freeman and Carina Solmirano, “Trends in world military expenditure, 2013” (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 14 April 2014).
  16. In 1998, Angolan troops intervened in the DRC’s conflict in support of President Laurent Kabila’s fight against the Tutsi rebels. Angolan authorities feared that if the Congolese rebels toppled the government they would provide support to rebel UNITA.
  17. “Angolan President takes up ICGLR chair” (Agência Angola Press, 15 January 2014).
  18. “President, UN Envoy discuss situation in Great Lakes region” (Agência Angola Press, 18 February 2014).
  19. “Angola, CAR sign legal instruments for bilateral cooperation” (Agência Angola Press, 5 March 2014).
  20. “Security Council Authorizes United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Central African
  21. “Republic” (United Nations Security Council, 10 April 2014)
  22. “Dos Santos garante atenção especial a situação na RCA” (Rádio Nacional de Angola, 6 June 2014).
  23. “Rwanda, Angola sign cooperation framework” (The New Times, 16 May 2014).
  24. “Uganda and Angola sign two major agreements” (Republic of Uganda Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 16 May 2014).26 Since having agreed to disarm, in May 2014, only 200 fighters out of around 1,500 have done so. See “African nations give rebels in Congo six months to disarm” (Reuters, 3 July 2014).
  25. 27 “Angola e Congo-Brazzaville garantem melhor segurança da fronteira comum” (Agência Angola Press, 16 June 2014). 28 “Angola e República Democrática do Congo debatem remarcação de fronteiras marítimas” (Observatório dos Países de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, 20 August 2012).
  26. The GCC was established with the purpose of managing threats and concerns common to the region in the particular domain of maritime security.
  27. “China’s Li Pledges to Boost Investment in Angola During Visit” (Bloomberg, 9 May 2014).
  28. “Brazil offers Angola $2 billion credit for energy, construction” (Reuters, 16 June 2014).
  29. “Ministros da Defesa de Angola e do Brasil assinam acordo de cooperação” (Observatório dos Países de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, 27 February 2013).
  30. “Portugal indebted to Angola after economic reversal of fortune” (The Guardian, 3 June 2014).
  31. See Pedro Seabra and Paulo Gorjão, “Intertwined Paths: Portugal and Rising Angola” (South African institute of International Affairs, 13 August 2011).
  32. “Portugal apresenta proposta de cooperação militar a Angola” (Observatório dos Países de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, 11 July 2013).
  33. See “Press Availability in Luanda, Angola” (S. Department of State, 5 May 2014) and “Angola” (United States Africa Command).
  34. “Angola-França: na procura da paz em África” (Radio France Internationale, 29 April 2014).
  35. See “Angola, Russia discuss military-technical cooperation” (Agência Angola Press, 28 March 2014) and “Angola and Russia sign Mutual Memorandum of Understanding” (Agência Angola Press, 8 April 2014).
  36. “George Chicoty, ministre angolais des affaires étrangères” (Radio France Internationale, 30 April 2014).
  37. “Concerns over readiness of new African strike force” (Mail & Guardian, 4 July 2014).
  38. “Ex-militares angolanos voltam às ruas em protesto” (Observatório dos Países de Língua Oficial Portuguesa, 10 August 2012).
  39. For further Reading on the subject see “Banco Mundial “satisfeito” com programa de reintegração de ex-militares” (Angonoticias, 7 July 2006), “Angola Overview” (World Bank) and “MDRP Final Report: Overview of Program Achievements” (Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program).
  40. For a thorough insight on the victor’s justice subject see Gary Jonathan Bass, “Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The
  41. Politics of War Crimes Tribunals” (Princeton University Press, 2000) and Victor Peskin, “Beyond Victor’s Justice? The Challenge of Prosecuting the Winners at the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda” (Journal of Human Rights, 16 August 2006).
  42. China, Russia, AU, SADC, and the CPLP have already declared their support for Angola’s bid. See “Angola confiante na eleição para o Conselho de Segurança da ONU” (Lusa via RTP, 17 June 2014) and “Angola seeks international support for Security Council” (Agência Angola Press, 27 September 2013).

Originally published in the Portuguese Journal of International Affairs – Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security (IPRIS).

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2 thoughts on “Angola: Towards Supremacy in Sub-Saharan Africa?

  1. Pingback: Angola: already invests more than it receives | East & South
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